欧洲公司治理结构的恶果

This has not been a salutary week for European corporate governance. AtVolkswagen in Germany and atIndustrivärden in Sweden, a system intended to encourage stability and long-term growth has instead created self-indulgence.

对欧洲的公司治理来说，3月底的一周可不是有益的一周。在德国的大众汽车(Volkswagen)和瑞典的Industrivärden，一个原本旨在鼓励稳定和长期增长的体制反而导致了自我放纵。
At VW, Ferdinand Piëch was ejected as chairman of the supervisory board by other members, including union representatives and politicians, after he tried to destabilise Martin Winterkorn, the chief executive. Mr Piëch, a member of one of the families that control VW, had done the same to Bernd Pischetsrieder in 2006. This time, he failed.
在大众汽车，费迪南德•皮耶希(Ferdinand Piëch)试图动摇首席执行官马丁•温特科恩(Martin Winterkorn)的地位，结果自己反被包括工会代表和政治人士在内的监事会其他成员赶下监事会主席宝座。皮耶希是控制大众汽车的其中一个家族的成员，他曾在2006年对时任大众汽车首席执行官的毕睿德(Bernd Pischetsrieder)采取过同样的举动。但这一次，他失败了。
欧洲公司治理结构的恶果

At Industrivärden, which along with the Wallenberg family controls more than half the value of the Swedish stock exchange, there was spectacular misbehaviour. Anders Nyrén was fired as chief executive on Monday after a scandal over the misuse of corporate jets by executives at SCA, the forestry and paper group, and their families.

在Industrivärden（该公司连同瓦伦贝里(Wallenberg)家族掌控着瑞典股市逾一半的市值），也发生了严重的不当行为。近期，媒体曝光了林业和纸业集团SCA的高管及家人滥用Industrivärden公司飞机的丑闻，致使Industrivärden首席执行官安德斯•尼伦(Anders Nyrén)遭免职。
Both companies are unusual and rivals have used power more wisely. The Wallenberg family has shown greater self-discipline in running its industrial empire company than Industrivärden, while BMW has combined familial control with allowing managers to exercise greater professional autonomy than at VW. But both illustrate how the European approach can encourage corporate insiders to behave badly.
这两家公司都非比寻常，它们的竞争对手对权力的运用要更明智一些。与Industrivärden相比，瓦伦贝里家族在管理自己的工业帝国时展现出更强的自律能力；而相比于大众汽车，宝马(BMW)在保证家族控股的同时，允许经理人行使更大的专业自主权。不过，这两个例子都向我们揭示出一点：欧洲的公司治理方式如何能够怂恿企业内部人员从事不当行为。
Short-termism is the risk of the US and UK approach, of diversified shareholders including hedge funds pressuring companies from the outside. Entrenchment is the risk of the European approach, of “active governance” by a few powerful shareholders that influence board directors and sometimes appoint them. Placing too much power in too few hands is dangerous.
美国和英国的公司治理都存在短视主义的风险，包括对冲基金在内的各类股东会从外部给公司施加压力。而欧洲的公司治理风险则在于壕沟效应，少数几名大权在握的股东进行“积极治理”，影响董事会成员，有时甚至直接任命董事。把太多权力集于几个人之手是危险的。
The good news is that, at both Industrivärden and VW, public exposure solved the problem. Mr Piëch, the former chief executive credited with rescuing VW in the 1990s, was used to behaving imperiously and causing trouble in private, but pushed his luck by doing so openly in an interview with Der Spiegel. Wrongdoing at Industrivärden could not survive being reported by the Svenska Dagbladet newspaper.
好消息是，在Industrivärden和大众汽车的例子中，媒体曝光解决了这一问题。曾任大众汽车首席执行官的皮耶希因在上世纪90年代拯救了大众汽车而受到好评，私下里则习惯于专横跋扈和制造麻烦，但在接受德国《明镜周刊》(Der Spiegel)的采访时，他却不知收敛、让自己的跋扈性格曝了光。Industrivärden发生的不当行为也没有逃过《瑞典日報》(Svenska Dagbladet)的曝光。
Germany and Sweden differ on specifics. In Sweden, a few shareholder “spheres” exert influence over an array of companies through investment holding companies and two-tier equity that gives them more votes than their economic stakes would imply. They also appoint company directors by holding seats on board nominating committees.
德国和瑞典的具体情况有所不同。在瑞典，少数几个股东“圈子”通过投资控股公司和双层股权结构（赋予他们较所持股权更大的表决权）来向一系列公司施加影响。他们还在董事会提名委员会中占据一席之地，从而能够任命公司董事。

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